One of the great untold stories of the Canadian healthcare system in the 21st century is the failure since the 2003 Toronto SARS crisis to put in place the necessary precautions to prevent another public health disaster.
That failure is seldom raised in public -- pandemic preparedness, like or , is one of those things the importance of which only become fully apparent when they fail -- and has been consistently underestimated by senior federal officials.
Now, three new reports published over the last month have forced the debate into the public eye, and their conclusions are worrying.
"A LEGISLATIVE FAILURE"
An (PDF) appearing online in the Canadian Medical Association Journal (CMAJ) last week called the state of Canada's pandemic planning "a national embarrassment." Amir Attaran, the Canada Research Chair in Law, Population Health and Global Development Policy, and the CMAJ's editors pull no punches:
In a deadly epidemic, Ottawa’s laws to protect Canadian poultry are stronger than its laws to protect Canadian people. Parliament must urgently legislate a way past the jurisdictional schisms before the Auditor General reminds us — again — that it is dangerously overdue. Or worse, before a deadly epidemic demonstrates our failures.
The country's main failing on pandemic planning over the last decade, the editorial says, is the absence of an agreement between the provinces and the federal government to share "epidemiologic information." Only one province -- Ontario, "humbled by the SARS epidemic" -- has agreed to share information about infectious diseases.
The lack of information sharing was brought up earlier this year, as well, in the Auditor General's 2008 report to Parliament. devoted an entire chapter to the problems with the Public Health Agency of Canada's surveillance of infectious diseases. That chapter's conclusions are a grim recounting of much of what many Canadian public health experts already know:
[L]argely because of gaps and delays in the data supplied by its partners and because of weaknesses in its informal data sharing methods, the Agency may not be able to systematically analyze and report information on public health threats. [...]
Given that the threats from infectious diseases are rising, Canadians expect the Agency to ensure that it is adequately monitoring important public health events to minimize the potential risks to their health and the economy. Despite some important accomplishments, the Agency has not satisfactorily addressed many of the concerns raised in our previous audits, some of which were evident during the SARS crisis.
A GLOBAL CONTEXT
In late May, a team of researchers from Australian National Univeristy in Canberra released a , in the online journal
Public Library of Science One, that compared pandemic planning for primary care in Australia, New Zealand, England, the United States and Canada.
As you can see from the table below, Canadian provinces fared well on some aspects of planning, including influenza care, infection control and public health surveillance. But Canada compared poorly with the other four countries when it came to non-influenza care and, importantly, in "linkages between health systems" -- just as the
CMAJ editorial and the Auditor General's report pointed out. Here are the numbers from the Australian comparison (full table available ):
FEDERAL DENIAL
In what is beginning to look like a pattern when it comes to the role of health research on public policy, the federal government remains willingly oblivious to the looming threat of the sorry state of public health surveillance communication between jurisdictions.
Federal Health Minister Tony Clement, who was the health minister of Ontario during the SARS outbreak and would therefore seem well positioned to recognize the danger of the current situation, nevertheless maintains that Canada's readiness to respond to a future pandemic has vastly improved over the past five years.
The effect of the federal government's refusal to acknowledge -- exposed domestically by the Auditor General and the nation's most influential medical journal, and now internationally as well -- has been to alienate some of Canada's physicians and public health experts. Take, for instance, the tenor of this question posed to Mr Clement :
Mr Clement, I'm a dedicated, proud, but not twice foolish, Canadian doctor with a family of four, who stayed and fought through the SARS epidemic and lost a close colleague and friend, Dr Nestor Yanga. What provisions has the federal government provided in the event medical people go down in the fight against the pandemic bird flu when it hits, like Dr Yanga did? Personally I don't think we, in Ontario, are anywhere near prepared and next time I plan to take a 'holiday' from my office at that time as do many other physicians I have spoken with.
- Dr Paul Stephan, family physician, Thornhill, ON
[Mr Clement's response:]
Look, the fact is whatever hits us next, there'll be some aspect of it for which we will be unprepared — that's the nature of the pandemic. If we were prepared for the pandemic, the pandemic wouldn't arrive, it would be strangled at its source. But are we better off than we were in January 2003, five years ago, a month and a half before SARS emerged? The answer is most definitely, yes, we are better off.
The majority of the evidence -- in stark contrast to Mr Clement's positive spin -- appears to show that while we may be better off than we were five years ago, we are nowhere near prepared for the next threat.
Image: Patel MS, Phillips CB, Pearce C, Kljakovic M, Dugdale P, et al. (2008) General Practice and Pandemic Influenza: A Framework for Planning and Comparison of Plans in Five Countries. PLoS ONE 3(5): e2269. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002269 (available free online )
Check out our website: